As the Western alliance system is turning upside down with the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States, there is an increasing need to assess how the changing international environment could affect the attitudes of political elites in the Western Balkans. Of course, the United States is “only” one of the Western actors in the region, but its policy orientation was a driving force and largely determined how the rest of the West could position itself. During the first Trump administration there were gaps between the EU and the US approaches but this time the gap seems to become a chasm in some areas.

Although there are more question marks than answers at the moment regarding how the relations of the United States and the EU will develop, under what conditions the war in Ukraine might be stopped – if it will happen at all –, and finally how the rules of international order will be re-written, the expectations of the leaders in the Western Balkans have certainly started to have an impact on their future agendas and their positioning strategies highlighting the nature of their relations with the European Union.

Of course, it takes two sides to tango. The EU has had troubles how to speak with one voice when it comes to the region and whenever it faced multiple challenges, the enlargement agenda for the Western Balkans lost from its weight. The support for EU accession of Ukraine partially was benefical for the region as well in the last three years but as the EU is facing de-coupling with the U.S., economic and defence concerns got on the top of the priority list. While many EU leaders still put great emphasis on political messages supporting Ukraine’s EU membership aspirations – Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission could imagine it to happen by 2030 –, those can be mainly considered as a support of the country’s sovereign choice about its future instead of being forced into the buffer zone of Moscow. But the Western Balkans doesn’t have such strategic weight as Ukraine and the decisions about Ukraine and how they are made will have an impact on the rule of international relations in the future. Some countries that are traditionally for EU enlargement of the Western Balkans like Austria and Hungary started to remind that the region should not be forgotten as the vacuum will be filled by other actors. It is needless to say, if the EU consider 2030 as a date of accession for Ukraine, Western Balkan countries should become members even before that date too. Otherwise, political frustration and disappointment towards the EU will get on the peak in the region and its influence and normative power can deteriorate further.

Meanwhile major EU member states that play a crucial role in forming EU’s future and priorities face difficult times. Germany faced a government crisis that concluded in elections in February. The outcomes will make the mainstream parties reconsider their policies to get closer to the demand of ordinary German citizens and to facilitate economic growth and strengthen security. The main winners of the elections are the Union parties, CDU-CSU which received 28.5% but this result is not enough for forming government alone. The former governing parties weakened significantly, and the Social Democratic Party (SPD) reached a historic low point by getting 16.4% of votes only. The Free Democratic Party did not even manage to get into the parliament. Meanwhile, parties critical towards the mainstream have been promoted by more than one third of the German voters which is without precedent since the World War II. The right extremist party, Alternative for Germany (AfD) managed to become the second strongest party in the country (20,8%) dominating the former East Germany. Large part of the younger generation of German citizens turned towards AfD and the leftist Die Linke (The Left) which implies that the centrist parties might have even less public support in the future if such trends remain. Although the new government are likely to be formed in April, the former Bundestag made already decisions on the amendment of the constitution that indicates directions of some policies. Giving up debt limit and increasing German defence expenditures shows that Germany decided to break with some former traditions in the light of the changing attitude of the United States towards Europe. Beyond defence industry, Infrastructure development is likely to get increased support while climate issues remain high on the agenda.

France’s president, Emmanuel Marcon – along with British prime minister – is trying to get tough in foreign policy to partly compensate his domestic political weaknesses. Accompanied by most leaders of EU member states and institutions, the EU is getting increasingly busy with building its own defence capacity requiring significant resources and strengthening support for EU path for Ukraine. In parallel, there is an increasing need to address obstacles to economic growth and competitiveness in the EU as well under worsening conditions created by the US tariff policy. By considering these circumstances, prospects for the Western Balkans to join the EU are not necessarily getting better. Only those countries like Albania that has a firm strategic orientation have a better chance, but the EU seems to be unable to make a real change in its general approach towards the region. Consequently, strategic level actions by the governments of the region will probably matter more than those domestic reforms that could really strengthen democratic institutions and rule of law, even if there will be some critical voices from EU leaders. This can have a negative impact on reforms and increase tension within the societies of the Western Balkans.

Hostile attitude against non-governmental organisations and civil protests has been already strengthened by the new U.S. administration. As Donald Trump decided to put the United States Agency for International Development on halt, government actors heavily criticised for corruption and anti-democratic actions got an impression that there would be a decreasing demand to comply with democratic standards to have good relations with the United States. In February in Serbia, police raided the premises of several civil society organizations searching for evidence on how USAID funds were (mis)used. These police actions and different forms of intimidation tactics (including the non-recognised use of sonic horn) are attempts to make citizens withdraw from protesting. Despite former criticism of the EU against Serbia’s state of rule of law, “the protesting citizens of Serbia have to fight for EU values without EU flag” – pointed out by an expert on the Budapest Balkans Forum 2025. This fight seems to lead to early parliamentary elections if no new government will be formed in the coming weeks. Although it is unclear what the future could bring, what seems to be certain is that stabilocracy in its current form would not continue to exist in Serbia. The current government parties with the leadership of Aleksandar Vučić won’t be able to sustain their previous positions without extensive use of pressure, and it will become increasingly difficult to create a majority government. The other option is that the president is going to apply – even – more (openly) autocratic tools to stay in power. The tension both among the protestors and within the government and state authorities is increasing, raising stability and security concerns in general

Meanwhile two unresolved issues related to Serbia are reaching a new stage. In Kosovo, the Self-Determination (VV) lost its stable majority in the parliament on the elections in February while the opposition managed to regain some of its past strength. There are various scenarios what coalitions could be formed but all of them seems to be unstable. Albin Kurti’s government had many conflicts with the EU and the USA. The first Trump administration openly hoped for the failure of Kurti in 2021. The uncertain domestic situation both in Serbia and Kosovo could further delay progress of the EU-facilitated dialogue. Although nationalist rhetoric won’t be able to hide domestic problems so much as before in Serbia, it will certainly prevail to mobilise government parties’ supporters either against the protesters or for the early parliamentary elections if they are going to be held. In Kosovo, the return of the former leadership might make the Kosovar side more opened to a compromise, but their positions are still weak and without a Serbian leadership to talk to, there is hardly any chance to create a gamechanger environment for the dialogue.

The political crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina also reached a new phase as Milorad Dodik, the President of the Serbian entity of the country was reminded by the US Secretary of State that separatism will not be promoted by Washington in any form and the U.S. will consider all possible options to sanction those who encourage separatist policies. This clear message came after several bills aiming the creation of parallel structures in RS were signed after the first level verdict of the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina against the Serbian politician. Such a clear sign from Marco Rubio was very important as nationalist politics in the Balkans usually expand as much as the main international actors allow them to do so. Rubio also called its European partners (France and United Kingdom) bilaterally to take the necessary steps to put an end on the escalation. The EU decided to temporarily increase the number of troops in EUFOR which was an important sign of determination to step up for peace and stability, but this does not mean that there is a clear idea about the way how Bosnian political parties could be made agree about the future of the country. Hungary emphasizes the necessity to consider the demands of all the three constituent peoples which is a key for a sustainable solution. Unfortunately, however, this position is articulated on the highest level in a way that puts equal mark between that position and the support of Milorad Dodik whose rhetoric largely contributed to an atmosphere in the country that tightens the possibilities for solutions. Dodik’s decisions now started to face increasing domestic opposition. In addition, Milorad Dodik and his circle miscalculated second time how the Trump administration would handle the political situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the light of the new reality, there was an attempt by the Speaker of the RS National Assembly to show some signs of readiness for compromise but afterwards the President of RS left BiH under unclear circumstances and travelled to Isreal via Belgrade despite the warrant issued against him. Whether this means his departure from Bosnian Serb politics – similarly to Nikola Gruevski’s escape from North Macedonia –, it is still to be seen but if yes, then the Bosnian Serb elite will need to redefine its position regarding the reform process of the country.  In parallel, the question remains open whether Washington will stick to the way of reforms that characterised the approach of the Biden administration that heavily relied on the use of the Bonn powers of the international high representative. In parallel, the EU will also have to articulate a clearer standpoint that could contribute to stability and security in the country.

This process must go hand in hand with an EU strategy building towards the whole Western Balkan region. The EU needs to understand that their approach in one country will have wider impact in the region and that political leaders in the region will make their calculations on risks and benefits – considering possible rewards from the EU also – before taking steps towards resolution of open bilateral and domestic political issues. Simultaneously, the EU’s over-enthusiasm for Ukraine might discourage countries that face multiple political obstacles but lacks the firm support of the EU to overcome it.

This article is brought to you by Gnosis Institute – Central and South-East European Institute for Sustainable Cooperation and Development.

Author:
Anna Orosz
Senior Researcher at Gnosis Institute – Central and South-East European Institute for Sustainable Cooperation and Development